📰Is Modi the King of the Transactional Movement?

PIMCO’s vice chairman called Modi the “leader of the transactional movement.” Today, we investigate if this is true and what this means for India.

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The Art of the Transaction

There’s a new ideology running global politics, and it isn’t the “free world” versus the autocrats. For better, or worse, It’s deal-making with all the chips on the table. In a world where alliances expire faster than trade deals, and ideology takes a backseat to opportunism, Narendra Modi has quietly emerged as the most skilled practitioner of this new order. Pimco Vice Chairman John Studzinski calls him the “leader of the transactional movement,” a label that sounds more Wall Street than Westphalia. But it fits. Modi has turned flexibility into statecraft—cutting energy deals with Russia, tech partnerships with America, and infrastructure pacts with the Gulf—all while keeping India’s interests front and center.

What Bloomberg’s piece on Studzinski gets right is that this isn’t just about personality or power, it’s about a fundamental shift in how India sees the world, and how the world sees India. The non-aligned era was about neutrality. The transactional era is about leverage. And in this global marketplace of interests, India has positioned itself not as a customer, but as a counterparty.

The op-ed’s starting point is the overstretched Western order. In Studzinski’s lens, leaders like Trump and Xi are responding to a world of compounding shocks, whether that is tariff spirals, tech disruption, global value chains unraveling, or geopolitical volatility. In that world, rigid ideological frameworks fracture under pressure. Enter Modi: the man with a reputation for pragmatism, deal-making, and strategic agility. According to the op-ed, Modi doesn’t aspire to lead by doctrine, but through selective alignment—India will partner where it benefits (technology, energy, trade), but also pivot when interests diverge (e.g., choosing Russian or Middle Eastern energy when prices make sense). In this world, loyalty is fungible.

That characterization is both flattering and threatening. For India, it underlines a latent tension: transactional relationships are by definition conditional. If Delhi embraces this posture, it gets to punch above its weight, but it also becomes more vulnerable to being sidestepped as soon as interests realign. The op-ed suggests that the U.S. respects Modi not because of ideology, but because he is useful and pragmatic. That may be accurate in parts, but India cannot rest on utility alone.

To see how this plays out, consider how Modi has already deployed transactional tactics. In energy, India has diversified its suppliers, Saudi, UAE, America, Russia, and African states, considering price and geopolitical risk. In supply chains, Delhi courts American investment while also deepening ties with Gulf, Japan, and ASEAN. In diplomacy, India is comfortable being proximate to both the U.S. and Russia, engaging China when needed, and expanding ties with Africa and Latin America. This flexibility has served India well; it’s allowed the country to extract benefits without rigid ideological baggage.

But the risk emerges when transactional flexibility becomes unpredictability. If deals are too mercurial, partners may hesitate to commit. If India signals it might pivot again tomorrow, foreign investors, strategic allies, and regional neighbors will demand deeper guarantees or discounts before engaging. The op-ed’s framing forces us to ask: Is India evolving into a trusted pivot or a convenient swing state?

A transactional posture also raises domestic alignment questions. In a democracy, where policy must eventually conform to constituency interests, frequent pivots create friction. Consider defense and technology deals: when India signs on to U.S. semiconductor initiatives but simultaneously engages with Russia or China on critical minerals, it invites contradictory oversight, licensing friction, or legislative backlash. The “multiple alliances” paradigm works in theory, but in practice it demands sophisticated coordination, and that’s harder than the op-ed lets on.

The op-ed hints at this when Studzinski remarks that disciplined flexibility is key: too much flexibility with no foundational discipline invites drift and stagflation. India’s inflation history, fiscal constraints, and bureaucratic inertia mean that “transactional mode” only works if the underlying institutions remain grounded. In that sense, being transactional is a veneer over what must be deep coherence in policy, regulation, and execution.

What does this mean for India’s relationships, especially with the U.S., China, and the Global South? First, with the U.S., a transactional India is not a souring India, but a calibrated one. Washington may warm to Delhi on technology, defense, climate, and supply chains, but it will also expect India to conform when pressured (e.g. trade, tariffs, strategic chokepoints). India must resist being a casual swing partner; it must negotiate for predictability and parity, not just access.

Second, vis-à-vis China, transactional diplomacy gives India a rhetorical edge: India can partner with China on some global platforms, compete on others, and maintain distance where needed. But China knows how to play long games, CPEC, 5G, manufacturing corridors, hard infrastructure. India must ensure its transactional mode doesn’t become reactive. If China builds for a 50-year horizon, India’s deals must weave in continuity, not only deal-to-deal opportunism.

Third, for India’s wider ambitions—Africa, Latin America, the Middle East—the transactional brand can be liberating. India’s strategy in these regions has always been more commercial diplomacy than ideological export. The op-ed’s theme legitimizes an approach of aligning where utility exists, rather than trying to impose value-driven alignments. But again, it brings us back to stewardship: India must deliver enough continuity so that partners don’t see it as fair-weather.

One worry the op-ed lightly glosses over is asymmetry. Modi may see the world as transactional, but many partners, especially smaller or strategic ones, approach India with a mix of symmetry and risk premium. These states will discount deals if they believe India will turn priorities quickly. India must manage that credibility gap. If it shifts too rapidly, it risks being viewed as unreliable.

Another danger: transactional leadership can be exhausting. Political capital is finite; credibility is earned over decades. If India tries to be transactional in every lane—defense, climate, trade, energy—it risks diffusion. There’s an advantage in being predictable in some pillars: moral leadership, constitutional democracy, and regional stability. Modi may be the face of transactional diplomacy, but the state behind him must retain coherence.

Parsing the op-ed also reveals what is left unsaid. Studzinski frames Modi as the transactional leader of the moment, but he doesn’t map out the tests: what happens when flexibility hits hard limits, when interests collide, when ideological lines must be drawn (e.g. human rights, strategic non-proliferation)? The op-ed is convincing but only paints a few parts of the full picture. India’s real challenge is not being transactional when it’s easy, it’s being transactional when stress intensifies.

For markets and investors, the op-ed is a cue. India’s model may favor deal flows, but also increase policy uncertainty. Deals may require shorter timelines, and conditionality may rise. Risk premia get baked in if partners begin to discount sudden shifts. The smart bet is not just on India’s next transaction, it’s on whether India can package those deals in credible longer arcs.

The Bloomberg op-ed is a mirror and a challenge. It reflects an external gaze: that India, under Modi, is becoming a master of dealcraft, a leader of the transactional world. But the challenge is internal: can India convert that external perception into lasting structural trust and policy stability? If it can, the transactional brand becomes a superpower tool; if it fails, it becomes a label of unreliability.

See you Monday.

Written by Eshaan Chanda & Yash Tibrewal. Edited by Shreyas Sinha.

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