đź“°America's Unusual Pakistan Play

The United States is cozying up to Pakistan again.

October 03, 2025

The United States cozying up to Pakistan again feels like déjà vu. In recent months, Washington has gone out of its way to revive ties with Islamabad: diplomatic visits, warmer rhetoric on Pakistan’s “regional role,” and a quiet effort to recalibrate the never-fully-broken security relationship. Today, we investigate what this means for India.

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America’s Pakistan Play and What it Means for India

Pakistani Flag in the Air

The United States cozying up to Pakistan again feels like déjà vu. In recent months, Washington has gone out of its way to revive ties with Islamabad: diplomatic visits, warmer rhetoric on Pakistan’s “regional role,” and a quiet effort to recalibrate the never-fully-broken security relationship. On the surface, this looks like an ordinary reset. In reality, it lands at a particularly awkward moment for Delhi. India’s own relationship with Washington, once the cornerstone of its Indo-Pacific pivot, is under strain from tariff battles, supply chain fractures, and diverging global priorities. The juxtaposition is striking: just as India’s “special” status is being tested, Pakistan is being welcomed back into the room. For India, the real question is not whether the U.S.–Pakistan thaw is surprising. It’s how Delhi should respond so that it does not get outflanked.

The historical backdrop matters. For decades, Pakistan was Washington’s frontline ally. During the Cold War and especially the Afghan war of the 1980s, the U.S. poured military and economic aid into Islamabad, strengthening the ISI and military establishment. But by the early 2000s, the cracks were obvious. 9/11 forced a reckoning, and the U.S. leaned heavily on Pakistan as a counterterrorism partner even as it realized that Islamabad was running a double game, assisting American operations on one hand while sheltering elements of the Taliban and other militant groups on the other. By then, India had begun its own rapprochement with Washington, opening its markets, signing the 2005 civil nuclear deal, and aligning on Indo-Pacific security. The U.S.–India partnership blossomed, while Pakistan’s reputation sank. For much of the past two decades, India was the clear favorite in Washington’s South Asia calculus.

But geopolitics is cyclical. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rise of China have reset Washington’s needs. For American policymakers, Pakistan is no longer just a problem, it’s a potential lever. Its geography, straddling Afghanistan, China’s Xinjiang province, and the Arabian Sea, makes it valuable. Its deep integration with Beijing through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) also makes it a pressure point: U.S. overtures to Pakistan aren’t just about Islamabad, they are about prying open China’s closest partner. And critically, a warming with Pakistan sends a subtle signal to India: you are important, but not irreplaceable.

That’s what should concern Delhi. India has invested years in cultivating the idea that it is Washington’s indispensable South Asian partner, the democracy that anchors the Quad, the growth market that balances China, the swing state in global supply chains. If the U.S. now courts Pakistan in parallel, it dilutes India’s bargaining power. Even if Washington insists, as it always does, that “India and Pakistan are separate relationships,” the strategic signaling is unavoidable. Islamabad gets a morale boost, Beijing gets a complication, and India gets a reminder that exclusivity is never guaranteed in diplomacy.

The immediate risks are obvious. Pakistan could feel emboldened in Kashmir, calculating that American tolerance or silence will follow. It may push harder in border skirmishes or asymmetric tactics, believing that Washington will not lean as heavily on Delhi as in the past. Diplomatic forums could also become trickier: U.S. references to Pakistan as a “stabilizing partner” could weaken India’s long-held position that Kashmir is a purely internal matter. Even without tangible policy shifts, the perception of renewed U.S.–Pakistan warmth could tilt atmospherics against Delhi.

At the same time, there are opportunities hidden in this discomfort. A more complex U.S.–Pakistan relationship could push India to diversify its security and diplomatic toolkit. For too long, Delhi has leaned heavily on the assumption of U.S. alignment. The risk is complacency. If Washington proves less reliable, India has every incentive to deepen defense and tech ties with Japan, Australia, Israel, and the Gulf. It can lean harder into Europe, where trade and climate diplomacy are rising. It can accelerate partnerships with Southeast Asia and Africa, where both U.S. and Chinese influence are contested. In short: Washington’s reset with Pakistan is a warning shot that India must continue building a multi-polar hedge.

The China factor complicates things further. Pakistan is not leaving Beijing’s orbit, its dependence on Chinese loans, infrastructure, and security guarantees is too deep. But U.S. engagement offers Islamabad more maneuvering space. That means India can no longer assume Pakistan will act purely as a Chinese proxy. Instead, Pakistan could try to extract concessions from both Beijing and Washington, raising the unpredictability of its behavior. For India, this means preparing for a Pakistan that is more opportunistic and less constrained.

The economic angle cannot be ignored either. Pakistan’s economy is in dire straits, but any U.S. goodwill, be it IMF backing, aid flows, or defense sales, can free up oxygen. For India, the risk is not that Pakistan becomes an economic rival; it’s that U.S. investors and officials begin to frame Pakistan as a “second option” in South Asia. Even marginal diversion of capital or attention weakens Delhi’s narrative of indispensability. Coupled with Washington’s tariff blitz on Indian exports, the symbolism is sharp: the U.S. can punish India while throwing lifelines to Pakistan. That recalibrates bargaining leverage at the exact moment India hoped to anchor global supply chains.

So what should Delhi do? First, it must resist the temptation to react emotionally. Complaining loudly about U.S.–Pakistan ties risks making India look insecure. Instead, India should double down on showing why it remains the more valuable partner: a $4 trillion (Rs.355 trillion) economy, a massive consumer market, a central node in Indo-Pacific security, and a democratic counterweight to China. That value proposition is stronger than anything Pakistan can offer, and India must constantly reinforce it.

Second, India needs to strengthen its regional leadership. Washington’s interest in Pakistan partly arises from instability in Afghanistan and the Gulf. If India can project stability in its neighborhood, through stronger ties with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and even outreach to Central Asia, it reduces Washington’s incentive to rely on Islamabad. Regional leadership is not just about trade agreements or summits; it’s about making sure South Asia’s narrative runs through Delhi, not Islamabad.

Third, India must harden its security posture. A U.S.–Pakistan thaw does not automatically mean American arms will flow freely again, but history shows it is always possible. India cannot afford to leave gaps along the Line of Control or in counterinsurgency capabilities. Investments in drones, surveillance, cyber, and domestic defense production are critical to offset any potential tilt in military balance.

Finally, India must recognize that strategic autonomy is not just rhetoric, it is now a necessity. The more Washington spreads its bets, the more India must anchor its foreign policy in multiple pillars. That does not mean abandoning the U.S.; it means engaging the U.S. on terms that are clear-eyed, pragmatic, and hedged. India should remain central to the Quad, but also to BRICS. It should deepen ties with Israel, but also with the Gulf. It should welcome U.S. capital, but also court Europe and Japan. This is not fence-sitting; it is active balancing.

In the end, Washington’s warmth toward Islamabad is not about choosing Pakistan over India. It is about reminding Delhi that in geopolitics, exclusivity is an illusion. For India, the lesson is simple but sobering: never assume irreplaceability. Strategic partnerships last only as long as they deliver value on both sides. India’s task now is to keep delivering, economically, diplomatically, militarily, so that it remains not just a partner of choice, but a partner without alternative.

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Written by Eshaan Chanda & Yash Tibrewal. Edited by Shreyas Sinha.

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